Burkhardt v. Beder, [1963] S.C.R. 86 by A., F. E.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 3, Number 2 (April 1965) Article 42
Burkhardt v. Beder, [1963] S.C.R. 86
F. E. A.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
A., F. E.. "Burkhardt v. Beder, [1963] S.C.R. 86." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 3.2 (1965) : 286-287.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol3/iss2/42
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
courts. The court was asked to determine whether the conduct of
the respondent Irene Perry in driving a motor vehicle amounted to
"gross" as opposed to "ordinary" negligence. On this distinction
depended the claim of the appellant here to take advantage of s. 99 (1)
of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 112, which provides
gratuitous passengers may recover from the host driver where the
driver's conduct is proved to be grossly negligent. The trial judge
had found that the cumulative effect of several negligent acts on the
part of the respondent did constitute gross negligence. In effect, the
majority of the Court of Appeal tried to evaluate the proper weight
to give to the evidence in applying to it the law. They (the majority)
felt there should be a flagrant quality in some of the acts which
cumulatively constituted gross negligence. Speaking for the Court,
Ritchie J. agrees with Freedman J.A. in his dissenting opinion that
"An appellate court should be slow to substitute its opinion for his
[t.j.] as to whether the defendant's conduct amounts to gross negli-
gence." Ritchie J. considers this is not a case "on which the opinion
of an appellate court as to the quality of the negligence should be
substituted for the opinion reached by the learned trial judge."
In effect the case is a reminder from the highest authority that
appellate courts must deal with questions of law, and rely for better
or for worse on the first hand impressions of the trial judge as to
what the facts are. As the Court pointed out:
: * .the difficult task of assessing the quality of the negligent action ...
in order to determine whether or not they [the facts] are to be charac-
terized as "gross negligence" involves a reconstruction of the circum-
stances of the accident itself including the reactions of persons involved,
and this is a function for which the trial judge who has seen and heard
the witnesses is far better equipped than are the judges of an appellate
court.
Burkhardt v. Beder, [1963] S.C.R. 86.
In the case of Burkhardt v. Bederl the Court has settled a prob-
lem in procedure which had apparently puzzled the Ontario Bar for
some time.
In this case the widow of the late Christian Burkhardt sued for
damages under the Fatal Accidents Act.2 The statement of claim as
originally delivered claimed general damages of $15,000 and $300
for funeral expenses. By an amendment made at the opening of the
trial, the claim for general damages was increased to $20,000.
1 [1963] S.C.R. 86.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 138.
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After the jury assessed the total damages of the plaintiff at
$26,000 as general damages and $300 as special damages, Aylen J.
awarded her $13,150 and costs in accordance with the finding that
her late husband had been 50% negligent. Three days after endors-
ing the record and discharging the jury, he recalled counsel and
informed them he had overlooked the fact that the total claimed
for general damages was $20,000 and, as he was of the opinion
that he could not enter judgment for more than one-half of that
amount and that it was now too late for a further amendment of the
statement of claim, judgment was directed to be entered for $10,150
and costs.
The Ontario Court of Appeal decided that there was non-direction
in the charge amounting to misdirection upon the question of damages
and set aside the judgment of the trial judge so far as it related
to the assessment of damages and directed a new trial restricted to
the assessment of damages.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Cartwright J., allowing the
appeal and delivering the judgment of the Court, disagreed that the
charge of the trial judge was inadequate and was unable to say that
the sum fixed by the jury was so inordinately high as to constitute
a totally erroneous estimate of the plaintiff's loss.
His Lordship then went on to hold that it was unnecessary to
deal with the plaintiff's contention that a further amendment of the
statement of claim should have been allowed because she was entitled
to $13,150 on the pleadings as they stood. He said that Aylen J.
had apparently considered himself bound by the decision of McRuer
C.J., in Grant v. Hare3 who had there purported to (but in fact
did not) apply the principle laid down by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Kong et al. v. Toronto Transporation Commission.4 Parker v.
Hugles5 and Anderson v. Parney6 seem to support the decision in
Grant v. Hare, but may be distinguished insofar as they turn on the
Division Courts Act R.S.O. 1927 c. 95. But if they are not distinguish-
able, Cartwright J. would decline to follow them as they were not
applied by the Court of Appeal in the Kong case. His Lordship
adopted the language of Orde J.A. who had dissented in Anderson v.
Parney:
The limit of $20,000 placed upon the general damages claimed by the
plaintiff in this action is a limit upon the amount recoverable by thejudgment of the court. It is immaterial by what steps the amount due the
plaintiff in respect of her cause of action is ascertained and fixed. When
so ascertained, judgment may be given thereon but not in excess of the
limit fixed by the amount claimed in the prayer for relief.7 F.E.A.
3 [19481 O.W.N. 653.
4 [1942] O.R. 433.
5 [19333 O.W.N. 508.
6 (1930) 66 O.L.R. 112.
7 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 91.
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